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Preconception Torts Not Actionable in New York
Plaintiffs' attempts to redress injuries sustained before birth,
long the subject of litigation,18a have spawned several distinct theo-
ries of liability.' In New York, for example, prenatal injuries, in-
volving trauma inflicted during intrauterine development, are ac-
tionable. 8 5 When the plaintiff's birth is itself the alleged wrong,
1 Note, Preconceptional Tort Liability-Renslow v. Mennonite Hospital, 27 DE PAUL
L. REv. 891, 891 (1978). In Dietrich v. Northampton, 138 Mass. 14, 17 (1884), the Supreme
Court of Massachusetts, speaking through Justice Holmes, ruled that there could be no
cause of action on behalf of an infant injured while in his mother's womb. This was the
prevailing view for the next 62 years. See, e.g., Buel v. United Rys., 248 Mo. 126,'132-33, 154
S.W. 71, 73 (1913); Drobner v. Peters, 232 N.Y. 220, 224, 133 N.E. 567, 568 (1921); Gorman
v. Budlong, 23 R.I. 169, 170, 49 A. 704, 707 (1901). But see Korman v. Hagen, 165 Minn.
320, 325-26, 206 N.W. 650, 652 (1925); Kine v. Zuckerman, 4 Pa. D. & C. 227, 230 (1924). In
1946, however, a cause of action for prenatal injury was recognized in Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65
F. Supp. 138, 142 (D.D.C. 1946). The Bonbrest decision signalled "the most spectacular ab-
rupt reversal of a well settled rule in the whole history of the law of torts." W. PRossER,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ToRTs § 55, at 336 (4th ed. 1971); Robertson, Toward Rational
Boundaries of Tort Liability for Injury to the Unborn: Prenatal Injuries, Preconception
Injuries and Wrongful Life, 1978 DuKE L.J. 1401, 1402. Initially, a number of courts chose
to recognize viability as the point at which the fetus acquired a right of action for injuries
sustained. See, e.g., Hale v. Manion, 189 Kan. 143, 146-47, 368 P.2d 1, 3 (1962); Mitchell v.
Couch, 285 S.W.2d 901, 906 (Ky. 1955). Since the theoretical basis for denying recovery for
prenatal injury was that the unborn fetus had no independent existence, see, e.g., Magnolia
Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Jordan, 124 Tex. 347, 357-58, 78 S.W.2d 944, 948-49 (1935), it was
not surprising that some courts found a valid cause of action by asserting the fetal capacity
for independent survival. This viability theory, however, has been criticized as "irrational
and illogical," Note, Preconception Injuries: Viable Extension of Prenatal Injury Law or
Inconceivable Tortl, 12 VAL. U.L. REv. 143, 153 (1977), and most courts have opted to rec-
ognize prenatal torts regardless of the viability of the fetus. See, e.g., Hornbuckle v. Planta-
tion Pipe Line Co., 212 Ga. 504, 504-05, 93 S.E.2d 727, 728 (1956); Daley v. Meier, 33 Ill.
App. 2d 218, 224, 178 N.E.2d 691, 694 (1961); Smith v. Brennan, 31 N.J. 353, 367, 157 A.2d
497, 504 (1960). Moreover, no court granting a remedy for prenatal injury has subsequently
denied recovery because the fetus was nonviable at the time of the injury. Todd v. Sandidge
Constr. Co., 341 F.2d 75, 79 (4th Cir. 1964) (Haynsworth, J., dissenting). At least one com-
mentator has reached the conclusion that "the viability rule is dead in causes of action for
prenatal injuries brought by living infants." Robertson, supra, at 1418.
'" Apart from prenatal injury, see note 183 supra, recovery has been sought under at
least two other theories: preconception tort, see Bergstreser v. Mitchell, 577 F.2d 22, 26 (8th
Cir. 1978); Jorgensen v. Meade Johnson Laboratories, Inc., 483 F.2d 237, 241 (10th Cir.
1973); Renslow v. Mennonite Hosp., 67 IM. 2d 348, 358, 367 N.E.2d 1250, 1255 (1977), and
wrongful life, see Zepeda v. Zepeda, 41 IlM. App. 2d 240, 245-46, 190 N.E.2d 849, 851 (1963);
Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 406, 386 N.E.2d 807, 809, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895, 897 (1978);
Williams v. State, 18 N.Y.2d 481, 482, 223 N.E.2d 343, 343, 276 N.Y.S.2d 885, 886 (1966).
'85 Byrn v. New York City Health and Hosps. Corp., 31 N.Y.2d 194, 200, 286 N.E.2d
887, 888, 335 N.Y.S.2d 390, 392 (1972), appeal dismissed, 410 U.S. 949 (1973); Endresz v.
Friedberg, 24 N.Y.2d 478, 483, 248 N.E.2d 901, 903, 301 N.Y.S.2d 65, 68-69 (1969); Woods v.
Lancet, 303 N.Y. 349, 357, 102 N.E.2d 691, 695 (1951); Kelly v. Gregory, 282 App. Div. 542,
543, 125 N.Y.S.2d 696, 696 (3d Dep't 1953). Prenatal injury has been defined as that "suf-
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however, recovery for such "wrongful life" has been denied.18 The
viability of yet a third basis for liability, namely, preconception in-
juries to a parent causing defects in a plaintiff infant, had re-
mained an open question in New York.18 7 Recently, however, in
Albala v. City of New York,""8 the Court of Appeals held that such
preconception torts are not actionable.18 9
In Albala, the infant plaintiff had been born brain-dam-
aged.1 90 The complaint alleged that the defect stemmed from the
defendants' negligent performance of an abortion on the plaintiff's
mother 91 approximately 4 years before the plaintiff had been con-
ceived.1 2 The defendants' motion for summary judgment was
granted at special term and affirmed by the Appellate Division,
First Department.193
fered by a child while yet unborn," Note, Torts Prior to Conception: A New Theory of
Liability, 56 NEB. L. REv. 706, 709 (1977), or as "injuries inflicted on an infant en ventre sa
mere [in the womb of the mother]," Robertson, supra note 183, at 1402. Most accurately, it
may be considered an injury resulting from tortious conduct occurring before birth but after
conception. See Comment, Preconception Torts: Foreseeing the Unconceived, 48 U. COLO.
L. REv. 621, 622-23 (1977).
186 Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 412, 386 N.E.2d 807, 812, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895, 901
(1978). Actions in wrongful life are "suits by children alleging that they have been damaged
by the very fact of their birth, and who seek compensation for their wrongful life." Com-
ment, Wrongful Birth: The Emerging Status of a New Tort, 8 ST. MARY's L.J. 140, 141-42
(1976). It is essentially a "legal cry of 'I wish I had never been born.'" 13 AKRON L. Rnv.
390, 390 n.7 (1979); see Zepeda v. Zepeda, 41 M11. App. 2d 240, 245-46, 190 N.E.2d 849, 851
(1963), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 945 (1964); Williams v. State, 18 N.Y.2d 481, 482, 223 N.E.2d
343, 343, 276 N.Y.S.2d 885, 886 (1966).
187 There is disagreement in the literature on the basic concept of preconception tort
Some sources define it as "an action seeking damages for prenatal injuries occasioned by
wrongful conduct occurring prior to the infant's conception," Note, Preconceptional Tort
Liability, supra note 183, at 891 n.5. Others have taken the position that "[p]reconception
injuries are those injuries which an individual receives as a result of damage to the genetic
structure of one or both of his parents (or other ancestor) prior to his conception." Com-
ment, Radiation and Preconception Injuries: Some Interesting Problems in Tort Law, 28
Sw. L.J. 414, 415 n.7 (1974); see Note, Preconception Injuries, supra note 183, at 144. Sig-
nificantly, no New York decision had addressed the issue until recently.
18 54 N.Y.2d 269, 429 N.E.2d 786, 445 N.Y.S.2d 108 (1981).
1829 Id. at 271-72, 429 N.E.2d at 787, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 109; see note 187 and accompany-
ing text supra.
'9o 54 N.Y.2d at 271, 429 N.E.2d at 787, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 109.
191 Id. The abortion left Ruth Albala, the plaintiff's mother, with a punctured uterus,
for which she recovered $175,000 in settlement of her malpractice claim. Id. It was this
uterine flaw that allegedly caused the plaintiff's injury. Id.
192 Id. The abortion was performed on December 27, 1971, and the infant plaintiff, con-
ceived in September of 1975, was born on June 3, 1976. Id.
19 Albala v. City of New York, 78 App. Div. 2d 389, 393, 434 N.Y.S.2d 400, 403 (1st
Dep't), aff'd, 54 N.Y.2d 269, 429 N.E.2d 786, 445 N.Y.S.2d 108 (1981). Judge Bloom, who
wrote the appellate division majority opinion, noted that despite the recent "explosive ex-
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On appeal, a divided Court of Appeals affirmed.1' Judge
Wachtler, writing for the majority, 195 initially observed that the
theory of recovery underlying prenatal injuries was inapplicable
to the case at bar because in prenatal, as opposed to preconception
torts, the mother and fetus are independent entities, each of whom
is owed a separate duty of care.196 Furthermore, although the
Court distinguished its decision in Park v. Chessin,19 which had
denied a cause of action for wrongful life, it nonetheless observed
that the "central concern" of Park, namely, the "staggering impli-
cations" of imposing liability for a less than perfect birth, was rele-
vant to preconception torts.198 Indeed, upon conceding that the in-
jury to the Albala plaintiff was foreseeable, the Court held that
since the scope of preconception tort liability could neither reason-
ably nor practicably be limited, the cause of action should not be
recognized.""'
Dissenting, Judge Fuchsberg agreed with the majority that the
facts of the case at bar satisfied the classic prerequisites of a negli-
pansion of tort law," no new causes of action had been developed. 78 App. Div. 2d at 391,
434 N.Y.S.2d at 402. The court concluded that recognition of a cause of action in preconcep-
tion tort would have to await an initiative by the legislature or by the Court of Appeals. Id.
at 393, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 403. Judge Carro dissented, arguing that "[t]he action now before us
is the strongest, clearest case for the extension of the prenatal injury doctrine to preconcep-
tion injury." Id. at 396, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 405 (Carro, J., dissenting).
19- 54 N.Y.2d at 275, 429 N.E.2d at 789, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 111.
19 All the judges concurred except Judge Fuchsberg, who dissented, and Judge Meyer,
who took no part in the decision.
1"- Id. at 272, 429 N.E.2d at 787, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 109.
7 Park v. Chessin, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978). In Park,
the plaintiff's mother lost a child, shortly after birth, to polycystic kidney disease. Id. at
406-07, 386 N.E.2d at 809, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 897. It was alleged that, as a result of the defen-
dant's representations that the disease was not hereditary, the Parks had had another child
who was born with the same affliction. Id. at 407, 386 N.E.2d at 809, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 897.
The essence of the claim was that had the parents been given proper information, the plain-
tiff would not have been born. Id. at 408, 386 N.E.2d at 810, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 898. The Court
dismissed that part of the complaint seeking damages for "wrongful life" as failing to state a
cause of action cognizable under New York law. Id. at 412, 386 N.E.2d at 812, 413 N.Y.S.2d
at 901.
The Park Court identified two defects in the plaintiff's contentions. First, the infant, by
being born, had not suffered any legal injury. The Court considered the question whether
nonexistence was preferable to life in a disabled state more philosophical than legal. Id. at
411, 386 N.E.2d at 812, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 900. Second, on a more practical level, the Court
was unable to ascertain the plaintiff's damages based on such a comparison, concluding that
"[r]ecognition of so novel a cause of action requiring, as it must, creation of a hypothetical
formula for the measurement of an infant's damages is best reserved for legislative, rather
than judicial, attention." Id. at 412, 386 N.E.2d at 812, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 901.
199 54 N.Y.2d at 272-73, 429 N.E.2d at 788, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 110.
199 Id. at 273-74, 429 N.E.2d at 788, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 110.
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gence cause of action: foreseeability and causation.200 Judge Fuchs-
berg further contended that the majority's reluctance to recognize
a preconception tort cause of action for fear of precipitating un-
bounded litigation was more properly a matter of legislative con-
cern.20 1 Concluding that the majority's fears were, in any event,
unwarranted, the dissent urged recognition of the plaintiff's "meri-
torious and legally cognizable" claim.202
It is submitted that the Albala Court too readily dismissed all
preconception tort causes of action. All preconception torts are not
similar, and indeed, may be classified in accordance with two fac-
tors: the time of injury to the mother and the time of injury to the
infant. In the case of a "pure" preconception tort, both injuries are
complete upon conception, as when, for example, the plaintiff's
chromosomal structure is affected by radiation or medication ad-
ministered to the mother.203 In other cases, however, although the
injury to the mother is complete before conception, the injury to
the infant does not occur until after conception.20 ' In Albala, for
example, the child's brain injury was sustained at some point sub-
sequent to conception.20 3 Clearly, since the gravamen of the action
in the latter case is prenatal injury, a tort already recognized in
New York,208 it appears that at least this variety of preconception
tort should be cognizable.20 7
20 Id. at 275, 429 N.E.2d at 789, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 111 (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting).
201 Id.
202 Id.
203 See Jorgensen v. Meade Johnson Laboratories, Inc., 483 F.2d 237, 239 (10th Cir.
1973) (allegations that birth control pills had altered the plaintiff's mother's chromosome
structure leading to the plaintiffs genetic defects); Zepeda v. Zepeda, 41 IM. App. 2d 240,
250-51, 190 N.E.2d 849, 854 (1963). See generally Comment, supra note 187.
204 See Bergstreser v. Mitchell, 577 F.2d 22, 24 (8th Cir. 1978) (injury occurring during
delivery); Renslow v. Mennonite Hospital, 67 I1. 2d 348, 350, 367 N.E.2d 1250, 1251 (1977)
("the negligent force ... had its impact upon the infant in its prenatal state"); Zepeda v.
Zepeda, 41 111. App. 2d 240, 250, 190 N.E.2d 849, 853-54 (1963).
205 The Albala Court indicated that the injuries had been sustained "during gestation."
54 N.Y.2d at 271, 429 N.E.2d at 787, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 109. This distinction between pre and
postconception onset of injury, to some degree, has been drawn in other jurisdictions. In
Renslow v. Mennonite Hospital, 67 IMI. 2d 348, 367 N.E.2d 1250 (1977), an infant alleged
injury as a result of a negligent blood transfusion given to her mother several years before
the infant plaintiff's conception. 67 III. 2d at 349, 367 N.E.2d at 1251. The Supreme Court of
Illinois found, inter alia, that the plaintiff had a right to be born free of "prenatal injuries
foreseeably caused by a breach of duty to the child's mother." Id. at 357, 367 N.E.2d at
1255. A concurring opinion noted that the holding did not reach genetically transmitted
injuries. Id. at 370, 367 N.E.2d at 1261 (Dooley, J., concurring).
200 See note 185 and accompanying text supra.
207 Recognition of an infant's right to bring an action for a tort committed before con-
1982]
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It is further submitted that the Court of Appeals properly
could have recognized even "pure" preconception torts. Conced-
edly, as noted by the Albala Court, and as previously pronounced
in Park, there is no right to a perfect birth.205 It is suggested, none-
theless, that the theoretical difficulties that led the Park Court to
deny a remedy for wrongful life should not hinder judicial recogni-
tion of preconception torts. 0 The Park Court, called upon to
weigh the value of an impaired human life against the value of
nonexistence, eschewed such balancing as a philosophical, rather
than a legal, exercise.210 No such impediment exists with respect to
preconception torts, however, because the recovery sought is for
calculable injuries.2 11 Recognition of a preconception tort, more-
over, would not involve judicial endorsement of a right to be born
without defects. Instead, the cause of action contemplates no more
than the right of an infant to be compensated for negligently in-
flicted injuries.212
ception is not totally alien to New York jurisprudence. In Piper v. Hoard, 107 N.Y. 73, 13
N.E. 626 (1887), the defendant fraudulently induced the plaintiff's mother to marry. Id. at
75, 13 N.E. at 628. The Court allowed the child to recover her promised inheritance even
though, at the time of the tortious conduct, the plaintiff child had not been conceived. Id. at
79, 13 N.E. at 630. As noted in Drobner v. Peters, 232 N.Y. 220, 133 N.E. 567 (1921), for
property interest purposes, "a legal personality is imputed to an unborn child." Id. at 222,
133 N.E. at 567. It is further suggested that the Albala Court could have found for the
plaintiff merely by fashioning a minor extension to the preexisting tort remedy for prenatal
injury. In Renslow v. Mennonite Hosp., 67 i. 2d 348, 358, 367 N.E.2d 1250, 1255 (1977), for
example, the court stated that when an action for genetic harm was presented, the court
would define the limits of recovery in accordance with logic and "current perceptions of
justice." Id. Surely, the Albala Court could have similarly confined itself to "whether there
can be a recovery under the circumstances of the instant case." Id. at 370, 367 N.E.2d at
1261 (Dooley, J., concurring). Indeed, as was noted by the dissent in the appellate division,
Albala presented the most favorable set of facts imaginable for the extension of prenatal
recovery. 78 App. Div. 2d at 396, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 405 (Carro, J., dissenting). "[T]he case law
on prenatal injuries is the best available means of predicting the rule which the ... courts
would apply to claims for preconception injuries." Bergstreser v. Mitchell, 577 F.2d 22, 25
(8th Cir. 1978).
208 54 N.Y.2d at 273, 429 N.E.2d at 788, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 110; Becker v. Schwartz, 46
N.Y.2d 401, 411, 386 N.E.2d 807, 812, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895, 900 (1978).
209 "[P]reconception tort cases alone do not present the logical and theoretical
problems of wrongful life suits." 13 AKRON L. REv. 390, 397 (1979); see Note, Preconcep-
tional Tort Liability, supra note 183, at 895.
210 46 N.Y.2d at 411, 386 N.E.2d at 812, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 900. The plaintiffs in Park, by
seeking recognition of a less than perfect birth as an injury to the child, asked the Court to
conclude that an impaired existence is of less value than not being born at all. As the Court
noted, this is in conflict with the "very nearly uniform high value which the law and man-
kind has placed on human life." Id.
211 54 N.Y.2d at 275, 429 N.E.2d at 789, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 111 (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting).
212 The Albala Court, although acknowledging that Park presented a different proposi-
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In summary, it appears that the Court of Appeals properly
could have sanctioned all preconception torts. Nevertheless, it ap-
pears that the Albala Court, in an effort to restrict the expansion
of prenatal liability, unnecessarily obfuscated this advancing field
of tort law.
David L. Mogel
tion regarding the calculation of damages, 54 N.Y.2d at 272-73, 429 N.E.2d at 787, 445
N.Y.S.2d at 109, failed to recognize a more fundamental distinction. The damages question
is an outgrowth of, and secondary to, an essential theoretical divergence between the cases.
In Park, the Court was troubled by the prospect of a "judicial recognition of the birth of a
defective child as an injury to the child." 46 N.Y.2d at 411, 386 N.E.2d at 812, 413 N.Y.S.2d
at 900. No such development was involved in Albala because redress was sought for the
physical injury inflicted upon the child. 54 N.Y.2d at 271, 429 N.E.2d at 787, 445 N.Y.S.2d
at 109. This crucial distinction is more than a computational difference, it is the difference
between the recognition of an unprecedented right and the endorsement of a right already
judicially legitimized. Robertson, supra note 183, at 1444; 13 AKRON L. REv. 390, 397 (1979).
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